How Not To Do It

How Not to Fight Terrorism

By David Cole
Friday, May 5, 2006; Page A19

After four years, numerous appeals, millions of dollars, and a massive investment of government personnel and resources, the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui concluded Wednesday with a life sentence. Many have cited the case as an example of how difficult it is to try terrorists in civilian courts. In fact, it is an object lesson in how the government's overreaching has undermined our security.

Four years ago Moussaoui was on the verge of pleading guilty to offenses that would have resulted in a life sentence. But he was unwilling to accept the government's insistence that he admit to being the 20th hijacker of Sept. 11, 2001 -- an allegation the government has long since dropped.

For almost two years, the case was stalled as the government sought Moussaoui's execution while denying him access to witnesses in its control who had testimony establishing that he was not involved in the Sept. 11 plot at all. Due process has long required the government to turn over such "exculpatory" evidence, but the government, citing national security, refused to afford Moussaoui access to this evidence. In October 2003 the trial court offered a reasonable solution: Allow the trial to proceed but eliminate the death penalty, because that's what the government's exculpatory evidence related to. The government refused that solution and spent several more years trying Moussaoui. The case ended where it began -- with Moussaoui facing life in prison.

Meanwhile, at a secret CIA "black site" prison, the United States is holding the alleged mastermind of Sept. 11, Khalid Sheik Mohammed. And at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it has Mohamed al-Qahtani, who the government now claims is the real would-be 20th hijacker. But the administration can't try either of these men, because any such proceeding would turn into a trial of the United States' own tactics in the war on terrorism. The CIA has reportedly water-boarded Khalid Sheik Mohammed -- a practice in which the suspect is made to fear that he is drowning in order to encourage him to talk. And Army logs report that interrogators threatened Qahtani with dogs, made him strip naked and wear women's underwear, put him on a leash and made him bark like a dog, injected him with intravenous fluids and barred him from the bathroom so that he urinated on himself. With these shortsighted and inhumane tactics, the administration essentially immunized the real culprits, so it was left seeking the execution of a man who was not involved in Sept. 11.

The Moussaoui case is emblematic of the administration's approach to fighting terrorism. It has repeatedly overreached and sought symbolic victories, adopting tactics that have undermined its ability to achieve real security while disregarding less flashy but more effective means of protecting us. In the early days after Sept. 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft sought to reassure us with repeated announcements of the detention of large numbers of "terror suspects" -- ultimately the government admitted to detaining 5,000 foreign nationals in the first two years after Sept. 11. Yet to this day not one of them stands convicted of a terrorist offense. Similarly, the administration launched a nationwide ethnic profiling campaign, calling in 8,000 young men for FBI interviews and 80,000 more for registration, fingerprinting and photographing by immigration authorities, simply because they came from Arab and Muslim countries. Not one of those 88,000 has been convicted of terrorism.

Bush administration refuses to talk directly with its main foes
By Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel
Knight Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON - Last month, the chief U.S. negotiator with North Korea wanted to meet privately with his North Korean counterpart, hoping he could persuade Pyongyang to return to talks on eliminating its nuclear weapons program.

But the meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Premier Kim Kye Gwan on the sidelines of a conference in Tokyo never took place.

Hill's superiors in Washington forbade him from talking directly to the North Koreans, said three U.S. officials, a conference participant and another knowledgeable expert. All requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The Bush administration also is refusing to talk directly with Iran about its nuclear program, with Syria about Middle East security and the infiltration of terrorists into Iraq, and, like Europe, with the Palestinian government led by Hamas, which it considers a terrorist organization.

This approach to diplomacy is drawing criticism.

"I believe that diplomacy is not simply meant for our friends. It is meant for our enemies," said Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state in President Bush's first term. "In fact, our enemies need diplomatic engagement more.

"We ought to have sufficient self-confidence in the correctness of our policy and the ability of our diplomats."

Bush administration officials argue that direct two-way negotiations raise expectations that the United States will make concessions. They say multinational pressure is more effective. Aides to President Reagan made much the same argument in an effort to derail arms-control negotiations with the former Soviet Union.

"You don't want to do the expedient thing. You want to do the right thing, the thing that's effective," said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack.

If these are the "grown-ups" we're in real trouble. These are the actions of people who want to have their own narrow way rather than understand that negotiations are *always* about compromise. Failure to play has worked out astoundingly well with North Korea, hasn't it?

Negotiation isn't about stamping your little foot and insisting on getting your way. Negotiation is always about a relationship. Bushco acts like a petulant child.